Alaskan Gas as a Currency of Alliance

The project itself has been under discussion for more than a decade. It envisages a roughly 1,300-kilometer pipeline from northern Alaska, a liquefaction plant, and gas exports to Asia. The main obstacle has always been the cost. Previous estimates put the project at tens of billions of dollars, and private investors have yet to find it sufficiently profitable. Washington is now addressing the problem politically, bringing in Asian allies that depend on the United States for trade and security. Taiwan’s contribution is small relative to the project’s cost. More important is the commitment to long-term purchases: contracts like these are what make LNG projects financeable. However, the deal rests only partly on guarantees from South Korea, which Trump calls a key investor, since Seoul has not yet made a final decision.

The broader trend is clear. The United States is steadily turning energy exports into a tool of foreign policy. Allies “pay” for tariff concessions and protection by buying American energy and investing in U.S. infrastructure. For Asian importers, this means choosing a supplier not only on price, but also on political alignment.

What does this mean for Russia? The Asian LNG market, toward which Russia has been redirecting its exports after losing the European market, is becoming increasingly politicized. Long-term contracts between U.S. allies and American projects are narrowing the space for Russian gas in Northeast Asia, where Alaska also has a logistical advantage over other U.S. suppliers. Under sanctions, Russia has to compete there primarily on price.

Author: Candidate of Economic Sciences, Associate Professor, Department of World Economy and International Finance, Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation, Tatyana Aleksandrovna Gorbacheva.